A case of ‘buyer beware’ in Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire

The United States-brokered ceasefire between the Iran-backed Hezbollah and Israel can be summed up by a well-known Latin expression: caveat emptor (let the buyer beware). Hezbollah commanders publicly called this ceasefire – “hudna” in Arabic – a G-dly intervention that gives the Iranian regime proxy an opportunity to recover, rearm, and reset before its next major assault. This isn’t a “ceasefire” according to the Western understanding of the term.

In the West, ceasefires are generally understood as the first steps to permanent solutions. For example, the 1994 Washington Agreement signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was a ceasefire turned peace agreement, as was the 1998 Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement in Northern Ireland that ended the Troubles, a 30-year-old conflict.

Though “hudna” loosely translates to “truce” or “armistice”, it’s less formal and binding than a Western ceasefire. Another term used to approximate “ceasefire” in the Middle East is “tahdiya”, a calming or quieting yet not a cessation of hostilities.

An indication of how these terms are used lies in the historical precedent of the 628 CE Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. The treaty was a pivotal event in Islamic history that affected Middle Eastern war and peace concepts. Hudaybiyyah stipulated a 10-year hudna, which was breached when militarily convenient. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat referenced Hudaybiyyah in a 1994 speech, referring to the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO. He hinted that Oslo was a strategic move that would be breached when convenient.

Similarly, when Iranian regime proxies Hezbollah or Hamas call for a ceasefire, their objective is to rearm and resupply before attacking again. Their intention isn’t an interim move towards a permanent peace. Most of the ceasefires in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973, and again, relevant today, the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), and the 1982 Lebanon War failed to bring lasting peace. Even many hard-won peace agreements that Israel has today with Arab countries are subject to this logic, in the strengthened presence of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated or Iran-proxy militias.

The Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire reflects the long shadow of the failed previous agreement in 2006, sanctioned by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which was unable to keep Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon south of the Litani River. Its lack of enforcement enabled Hezbollah to embed itself on the Israel-Lebanese border and nearly led to a Hezbollah land invasion like the October 2023 Hamas invasion from Gaza.

This cessation of hostilities is intended to correct the failures of 1701. It enables the Israel Defense Forces to remain in southern Lebanon for two months; mandates US monitoring on the ground; requires the deployment of the Lebanese army in south Lebanon; the return of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), US forces, and international commission monitoring; and the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. This seems more like a Chanukah wish list than a realistic regime correction.

The question remains: why agree to a ceasefire now when Israel has decimated the terrorist force serving the mullahs; eliminated Nasrallah and his officials; carried out legendary operations like the beeper explosions; and destroyed much of Hezbollah’s positions and military-economic reserves? Hezbollah’s aims are still genocidal attacks on Israel and obedience is to Iran.

There are still some advantages to a ceasefire. Domestically, it offers respite for Israel Defense Forces soldiers, particularly reservists, who have been fighting for more than a year from Gaza in the south to Lebanon in the north, with thousands wounded, and families and livelihoods suffering at home. Israel also wants to expedite American arms supplies and compel Hamas, now nearly decimated and isolated, to negotiate a hostage deal. Israel, however, hasn’t eliminated Hezbollah, which would require occupying south Lebanon up to Beirut. The ceasefire also disconnects Hezbollah and Hamas, signalling to Hamas that its loss of Hezbollah and Iran’s backing will depreciate its leverage and bring its ultimate defeat.

The ceasefire also has strong diplomatic implications. It’s a legacy gesture to US President Joe Biden in his last weeks in office to enable him to claim a foreign policy achievement after his largely unsuccessful Middle East intervention. Perhaps more significantly, it’s meant to help avoid a repeat of Obama’s parting shot across Israel’s bow in 2016 in refusing to level a US veto of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 that falsely and incorrectly resolved that all Israeli building activity beyond 1967 lines was illegal.

The ceasefire also sends a message to the incoming Trump administration that Israel is doing everything it can to vindicate Trump’s promises that he will end wars and prevent new ones from breaking out.

But there are also negative aspects. The ceasefire isn’t a solution for 7 October-style Iranian-backed genocidal plots, and it probably will fuel Hezbollah’s motivation to avenge Israel’s targeting of its senior command structure and leader, Hassan Nasrallah. The ceasefire buys Hezbollah time to reset its tactics and replace its leadership. With Iranian assistance, it’s expected to restore its military capability. It can be cogently argued that the fundamental strategic picture hasn’t changed.

Lebanon is still dominated by an Iran-embedded “deep state” led by the remaining Hezbollah proxy army. Despite Israel’s decapitation of its senior leadership, the army remains stronger than official Lebanese security and government organs. This Iran-controlled structure still bypasses the official state as it did when it launched its Hamas-support terror campaign on Israel on 8 October 2023. Jonathan Speyer notes that the Lebanese armed forces are heavily infiltrated by officers and soldiers with links to Hezbollah, and aren’t willing or able to prevent Hezbollah from re-emerging and rearming.

Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs Arab affairs analyst Yoni Ben-Menachem has noted that despite being weakened, Hezbollah’s elite “Radwan” force is expected to rebuild and renew its terrorist infrastructure, posing a significant threat. One scenario under consideration by Israel’s security forces is the possibility of Hezbollah resuming kidnappings, as it has done in the past. The recent 2 November IDF operation that captured senior Hezbollah naval officer Imad El-Hamaz in the Al-Batroun area on the northern Lebanon coast may provoke a retaliatory response.

What should be done now?

As Ben-Menachem suggests, Israel must abandon its containment policy and adopt a more aggressive stance against Hezbollah. It must fully restore its deterrence with heightened vigilance and consistent military operations. It should continue targeted military operations, counter Iranian influence, establish an advanced intelligence system, and enforce a buffer zone near the border. Israel must also remain vigilant and uncompromising regarding violations of the ceasefire or of Resolution 1701 to avoid complacency.

While Israel had significant successes in the war against Hezbollah, the organisation remains militarily intact. Once Israeli military pressure eases, Hezbollah is expected to recover rapidly. In the short term, Israel can safely facilitate the return of tens of thousands of displaced residents along its northern border. However, maintaining long-term security will require heightened vigilance.

The ceasefire doesn’t end the Iranian regime’s 45-year war to destroy Israel, the United States, and its war on the West. Regime change remains the most viable lasting solution. Until the “head of the regime octopus” is “decapitated”, partial solutions will only prolong and even deepen the conflict.

• Dr Dan Diker is president of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs. He can be contacted at diker@jcpa.org