Netanyahu’s pandering undermines Israel’s protection

Former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant presented a rare glimpse into the mechanics of modern-day warfare in an interview with Dan Senor recently, showing the political paralysis that defines its most decisive moments.

Gallant recounted a missed opportunity four days after the 7 October massacre and three days after Hezbollah launched its attacks in the north, when Israel had the chance to neutralise Hezbollah as a military force in a single, co-ordinated operation.

“Hezbollah started a war of attrition against Israel,” Gallant recalled. “The attacks began on 8 October 2023, in the Hermon Mountain region, then escalated across the Galilee.” Intelligence assessments were unequivocal: this was a calculated strategy to stretch Israeli defences thin, forcing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to split its focus between Hamas in the south and Hezbollah in the north.

Within days, “we had three divisions in the north, with tens of thousands of soldiers, tanks, armoured vehicles, and a significant portion of the Air Force on standby. At any given time throughout this war, we needed to preserve at least two-thirds of the Air Force to be ready for Hezbollah,” Gallant said.

Then, on 10 October, intelligence revealed that 14 senior leaders – 11 from Hezbollah, and three from the Islamic Republic of Iran – were scheduled to meet at a single, vulnerable location. Among them was Hassan Nasrallah himself. Under scrutiny with Israel’s military command, they concluded that the opportunity was too significant to pass up.

It wasn’t just an opportunity, it was the opportunity. Israel had the element of surprise. Hezbollah had already fired the first shot, providing full justification for retaliation. Global sympathy was at its peak among Israel’s allies and domestically, Israel was unified. Militarily, the IDF was fully prepared, with ground forces stationed in the north and the Iron Dome at full capacity. More than that, the strike would have redefined the entire balance of power in the Middle East. By eliminating Hezbollah, the strongest link in the “Axis of Resistance”, within the early days of the war, Israel could have then shifted its full weight toward dismantling Hamas, with tens of thousands of additional troops available to wear Gaza’s jihadists down systematically. As Gallant said, “When dealing with multiple threats, you go for the strongest first, this is basic military strategy.”

And yet, we know that the operation was never carried out. The reason? Political paralysis. Netanyahu, upon hearing the plan, immediately deferred to Washington. “The moment he said that, I knew he wanted to avoid making the decision,” Gallant said. “You don’t ask the United States president, who opposes escalation, for permission. The answer was predictable.”

Gallant’s frustration was quiet yet palpable as he talked to Senor. “I returned to the prime minister and told him we had to act. He pointed to the [Tel Aviv] buildings around us and said, ‘None of this will survive Hezbollah’s retaliation.’ He reiterated this concern repeatedly that day. I wasn’t that pessimistic. I believed we could defeat both Hamas and Hezbollah. I had full confidence in our capabilities.

“The fighter jets were already in the air awaiting the final order,” Gallant states. “When the decision came down [from Netanyahu], they were ordered to land.”

What followed was inevitable. A year later, Israel was forced to fight Hezbollah without the element of surprise, without optimal conditions, and at a far greater cost. True, the IDF still managed to dismantle Hezbollah’s military power and eliminate its command, but only after enduring prolonged missile barrages on Israeli population centres and towns and more than a year of displacement from the north, leaving more than 60 000 residents homeless, more than 60% of agricultural land decimated, and a war that stretched Israel’s military resources across two active fronts, with a direct impact on the IDF’s capacity in Gaza.

The cost of Netanyahu’s decisions isn’t theoretical; it’s quantifiable – lives lost; prolonged conflict; in allowing Hezbollah’s strategy to fracture Israel’s war effort; in the simple fact that Tel Aviv is still standing; and in economic and strategic damage that could take years to repair.

Netanyahu has spent decades curating his image as Israel’s indispensable protector, the Churchill of the Jewish state. But the comparison collapses under even the mildest scrutiny. Churchill unified his country against Nazi Germany and led with decisive action. Netanyahu, by contrast, has consistently weakened Israel’s security, misjudging threats, deepening internal divisions, and hesitating when it matters most.

A Churchill takes action. A Netanyahu defers, delays, and then retroactively spins his inaction as prudence. Netanyahu’s genius lies not in anything he does, but in convincing his now shrinking base of followers that his rhetoric ought to be confused with reality.

The pattern is inescapable. For years, Netanyahu declared that under his leadership, Israel would never allow the Islamic Republic to acquire nuclear weapons. He built his international reputation on warning the world about Tehran’s ambitions. And yet, throughout the war, the regime’s nuclear programme has been closer to completion than ever before. Israeli deterrence, once formidable, was shattered on 7 October. In many ways, we have regained it, in other ways, not at all. Tehran clearly felt emboldened enough to launch direct missile attacks on Israel, something it had never dared to do in the past.

Netanyahu’s 2015 speech before the US Congress warning against the Iran nuclear deal was a masterclass in political theatre. But what did it achieve? Nothing. The deal was signed. Of course, there are other reasons for this, which lie in Washington. But in the years that followed, when Israel had opportunities to take direct action against the nuclear programme, Netanyahu hesitated and did nothing. The cycle repeated until the inevitable happened.

Then there’s Gaza. In 2009, while campaigning, Netanyahu declared, “We can’t rely on miracles. We need action to eliminate the threat. Only one action will accomplish this, and that’s to topple the Hamas regime in Gaza.” Yet, over the next 15 years, despite multiple wars and countless opportunities to destroy Hamas, he consistently chose containment over victory.

If the Americans have a singular talent for misunderstanding the nature of the jihadist enemy, Netanyahu has proven himself no less adept at this failure. The difference is that for Washington, this confusion is often born of distance, both geographic and ideological. For Netanyahu, it’s something worse: either a wilful blindness or a cynical refusal to act, despite knowing exactly what’s at stake. And if he does understand the nature of the enemy, as he so often claims, then his behaviour isn’t just an indictment of incompetence, but of something far more damning: cowardice. Cowardice with deadly consequence.

The 2014 Gaza war lasted 50 days, longer than any of Israel’s previous wars with Hamas. The initial goal was to neutralise Hamas. Instead, throughout the war, Netanyahu continuously scaled back the operation and ultimately leaked classified Cabinet discussions to justify his decision to prevent the war from escalating further, undermining the objective of eliminating Hamas’s capabilities. The price of that caution and inaction was paid on 7 October. If one seeks a direct historical link between the failures of Israeli policy and the events of 7 October, it’s not the 2005 disengagement but the decisions made from 2013 to 2014, when Netanyahu, instead of crushing Hamas at its weakest, propped it up with Qatari cash, ensuring its survival for years to come.

Netanyahu isn’t a strategist. He’s a tactician, a political survivalist whose short-term calculations have for years now come at the cost of Israel’s long-term interests.

In time, we will probably uncover the full extent of the policies and backroom deals Netanyahu pursued in the years leading up to 7 October. Some of it will be incompetence he will attempt to disguise as strategy. Some of it will be evidential, cynical self-preservation masquerading as pragmatism.

What’s needed now is responsibility – real responsibility, not the deflections and political manoeuvring that have defined Netanyahu’s political career. The only path to that is an independent state commission of inquiry into the failings of 7 October, something his government has worked tirelessly to avoid.

This isn’t solely about assigning blame, it’s chiefly about ensuring that the catastrophic failures of 7 October are never repeated. It’s about a reckoning with failed policies and it’s a necessary step toward national healing. Without it, the wounds of this disaster will fester and the lessons that must be learned will remain ignored. This is a price no Israeli, regardless of their political views or affiliations, should be willing to pay. The time has come to return to a fundamental question: what is in the best interests of Israel and by extension the Jewish people in the 21st century?

• Samuel J. Hyde is a writer and a fellow at The Jewish People Policy Institute in Jerusalem.