The art of warfare

International newsrooms lit up when the news broke of thousands of pagers exploding in the hands and pockets of Hezbollah commanders across Lebanon on 17 September. The blasts signalled a new phase in the year-old attritional battle on Israel’s northern border.

The audacious operation, which Ian Fleming would not have been able to conceive as a work of fiction, severely rocked Hezbollah’s command structure. The next day, before there was time to assess the extent of the damage wrought on the group’s command and control structures, a further series of explosions surgically targeted another 500 communication devices.

Instantly, the much-vaunted Hezbollah was left with a severely damaged C3 (command, control, and communication) system, and its morale plummeting to all-time lows. Iran’s favourite proxy has been dealt a lethal blow, rendering enormous psychological and material damage, and leaving it vulnerable to an Israeli conventional attack should the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) choose to deliver a well-timed strike.

I have been careful not to name Israel as the protagonist behind this startling Trojan Horse operation as the Jewish state has not claimed responsibility. However, despite the absence of an official declaration, the world knows that only one entity is capable of conceiving and then executing such a daring plan.

One can only imagine the impeccable planning, incredible espionage, impossible logistics, and flawless technological skills deployed. I have used the term “Trojan Horse” for a good reason, as the operation mimicked the best of ancient Greek mythology. Similarly, the Greeks coaxed the Trojans into bringing a wooden horse filled with concealed soldiers through the gates of their impregnable defences.

The operation also encompassed the doctrine of the ancient Chinese military sage Sun Tzu of “being like water and following the course of least resistance”. Another British military philosopher, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, spoke of the “strategy of the indirect approach”. He encouraged commanders to bypass areas of apparent resistance and prepared defences and instead choose the less obvious or more convoluted route to unhinge the enemy psychologically.

Students of warfare are taught that military science is made up of a measure of science and, most importantly, a good measure of art. I have already hinted that the planners of this operation pushed the envelope regarding the science of delivering thousands of lethally rigged pagers into the hands of the enemy. Apparently, the planners used a myriad front companies to disguise their origin and intent.

The process of intercepting Hezbollah’s request for communication devices and managing to ensure they reached their intended target, modified with deadly intent, goes beyond belief. Ensuring that the devices exploded in unison on a single command delivered hundreds if not thousands of kilometres away will enter the history books as an unimaginable technological triumph. The study of military science, beyond ensuring that past mistakes are not repeated, is also about discovering the art of the possible. No-one will ever hold an electronic device or switch on a microwave again without trepidation.

Now to the art of warfare. Israeli society encourages free thinking and intellectual pursuits, leading to their unique brand of inquiring minds. Israeli culture encourages chutzpah, resulting in an excess of self-confidence and audacity that can often annoy an outsider. Intellectualism, intuition, and chutzpah are carried over into the IDF’s and other state security organs’ military doctrine.

The IDF’s military doctrine reflects the society at large, and few other militaries in the world allow the latitude for decision-making that occurs at all levels within the force. Encouraging intuition and devolving decision-making down to the lowest levels makes for a highly agile military security cluster. We call these attributes collectively the art of warfare. Not many nations besides Israel have the ability to execute an operation of this nature.

A year’s worth of brutal and complex warfare in Gaza has honed the IDF’s urban warfare military doctrine to standards that will be taught internationally at military colleges for years to come. These skills have come at an enormous price in military and civilian casualties on both sides. The IDF can field a large army of combat-hardened soldiers, unlike before 7 October, when many doubted that the new generation of computer-game kids would rise to the occasion.

The IDF has performed beyond expectations, despite the adverse onslaught of world opinion and the constant threat to the lives of the remaining hostages. In subduing, if not wholly defeating, Hamas, Israel has skilfully avoided a war on two fronts. Crippling blows dealt recently to the command and control of Hezbollah may open an opportunity for the IDF to strike at south Lebanon and end the rain of missiles that has made 60 000 Israelis refugees.

History teaches that missiles and air strikes alone are insufficient to defeat a resilient enemy or bring them to the negotiating table. Israel has used a unique form of hybrid warfare, where the opportunities of an interconnected and globalised world have been exploited to weaken the adversary. Some claim, with justification, that Hezbollah is not the same adversary as Hamas. It is far better trained and equipped and enjoys a severalfold numerical advantage over Hamas. However, the IDF is not the same army it was pre-7 October 2023, having proved itself in brutal combat. Securing a safe zone free of Hezbollah missiles may require a boots-on-the-ground approach, with all its attritional caveats. Israel has an opportunity that cannot be squandered, although its exploitation may be costly.

• Dr David Brock Katz is a research fellow at Stellenbosch University in the faculty of military science. He has published three books and numerous academic articles dealing with aspects of South African military history and military doctrine.