Unstable Syria should be treated with caution

The unstable situation in Syria is causing some unique strategic challenges for Israel, and has to be handled with some finesse by its leaders.

To provide some background, Syria was governed by Bashar Al-Assad, one of the most brutal dictators of the 21st century. He was, according to many accounts, responsible for the deaths of almost 500 000 Syrians. He was also one of Iran’s closest allies, allowing it to set up bases and weapons depots on his territory and to use the country as a transit to pass weapons freely to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

So, when he was overthrown by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) towards the end of last year, most countries [including Israel] celebrated. The problem, however, is that HTS was an al-Qaeda affiliate a decade ago, and even though it has in recent times broken away from the group, no-one is exactly sure where it now stands.

On the one hand, it is against Hezbollah and Iran, who propped up the Al-Assad regime and fought it and its supporters, on the other, given its history, it’s not that clear that in respect of Israel, the enemy of their enemy is their friend. The leader of HTS has switched from military fatigues to suits, and given interviews to the Western media saying that he wants to be moderate and respect the rights of all Syrians, but he has been evasive when it comes to elections, political parties, and what law will be imposed on Syria. The Jerusalem Post on 30 March has reported that President Al-Sharaa has just released a new government which includes ministers educated in the West, one woman, and members of the Druze, Kurdish, Christian, and Alawite minority groups, which is obviously positive.

Israel’s first challenge is whether it trusts that the new leader has reformed.

Before 7 October 2023, it might have, but post 7 October, Israel has become much more concerned about what happens on its borders and much more proactive in neutralising potential threats. So, the first thing Israel did was to destroy the Syrian army’s heavy weapons and navy, and it has also occupied a small buffer zone inside Syria, adjacent to the Golan Heights.

However, the real strategic challenge is how long Israel stays in Syria. Already, on 25 March, the Israel Defense Forces said its troops in southern Syria were attacked by gunmen. They returned fire, and called in an air strike, killing at least five people. The shoot-out supposedly sparked outrage among some Syrians, who urged the interim government to send forces south. Israel wants its troops to stay in Syria to prevent threats from emerging and prevent any unpredictable government troops from moving close to the Golan Heights, but by staying too long in Syria, it runs the risk of turning the new government into an enemy and may end up creating more trouble than it prevents.

The second challenge is Turkey. Turkey sees itself as the great power in the region, and seeing as it controlled Syria in Ottoman times, it sees itself as the natural protector and manager of events in Syria. It also occupies a chunk of northern Syria. In addition, Turkey wants to prevent the Kurds of northern Syria from controlling too much territory there and potentially creating their own autonomous state, which would create instability among Kurds at home. Turkey has attacked the Kurds of northern Syria before, and often threatens to do so again.

In addition, Turkey has emerged as a potential key actor in mediating peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, even potentially being spoken about as a potential contributor to a future peacekeeping force in Ukraine, as it has good relations with all parties in the conflict. This means that Europe is likely to give Turkey a relatively free hand in Syria, to keep it onside in the more important matters of European security. Turkey is well aware of this, and therefore feels less constrained in protecting its interests in Syria.

What makes things even more complex is that the Kurds are informal allies of Israel, and, particularly in Iraq, have had some – though informal and behind the scenes – collaboration with Israel. This clash of interests over Syria as a whole, and with the Kurds of northern Syria, has the potential to make a very bad relationship between Israel and Turkey even worse

In conclusion, Israel definitely doesn’t want Syria to collapse. It needs the country to be stable. It therefore has to be careful to create the right balance in its behaviour towards Syria, to make sure that in trying to prevent any threat arising, it doesn’t destabilise Syria and create the very threat it’s trying to prevent. While not allowing hostile forces to approach the Golan Heights, it also needs to be sure that it doesn’t act too aggressively towards Syria, thereby driving it into the arms of Turkey. Clearly a well-thought-out and nuanced approach needs to be applied by Israel’s strategists.

Interestingly, it’s not just Israel that has this dilemma. Europe is seriously debating if and when it should drop sanctions against Syria. Though not wanting to fund a still-unknown leader, it also doesn’t want Syria to collapse economically, which it is in danger of doing. It therefore faces a similar dilemma to Israel in trying to create a policy that brings about a Syria that has a chance of success, while not closing its eyes to all the risks.

• Baruch The Balanced is an attorney who can’t be named for professional reasons, but who studied politics and international relations at university.