When ceasefire becomes warfare

Hybrid warfare requires more from the military than the demands of traditional conventional combat. Cyber warfare; irregular warfare; the control of information and disinformation; lawfare; and other non-military aspects should inhabit a military’s toolkit. Modern warfare is a cocktail of traditional military and non-military measures.

The Israel Defense Force’s (IDF’s) conduct has been placed under a microscope and social media has given the world an unprecedented window into the conflict. Most of the reporting, whether mainstream or on social media, has painted a lopsided picture of the IDF’s application of its urban warfare doctrine. Hamas controls the narrative, and reported casualties via Hamas fail to distinguish between combatant and civilian. No reliable evidence exists to back up reported statistics. The Israeli counter-propaganda machine has been a failure apart from the lone voices of Douglas Murray and Jonathan Conricus.

Since 7 October 2023, Israel has found itself in the invidious position of having to make choices between the lesser of two evils. The IDF, labelled as the perpetrator rather than the victim, has waged urban warfare in the most difficult circumstances. For instance, the recent Russian/Syrian bombardment of Aleppo on 1 December 2024, killing 300 civilians, hasn’t even received a blip on the world’s left-wing radar. The IDF hasn’t been able to apply the best military decisions when attempting to dismantle Hamas’s fighting power while at the same time minimising civilian casualties and trying to free the hostages. It has made difficult choices that have placed its soldiers in more danger than if it was operating with a free hand. Internal pressure from the families of the hostages combined with diminishing American support from the Biden administration have uniquely challenged the IDF. Several ceasefires necessitated by the desire to secure a release of hostages or because of international (and American) pressure have upset the IDF’s operational momentum.

In a conflict bereft of optimal choices, Israel has often failed to please anyone any of the time. Steering a convoluted course of the least damage and destruction has had to suffice. Further exacerbating an already precarious situation has been the outright hostility of some European Union members such as Spain, France, and the United Kingdom. Instead of these Western nations regarding Israel as the bulwark against fanatical Islamists hell bent on the destruction of the West, they have sided with the 7 October perpetrators. More concerning is the capricious nature of Biden’s Democrats, who have undermined the Israeli military effort from the beginning. They have threatened and cajoled Israel into truncating the IDF operationally, and have either slowed their supply of much needed ammunition on occasion or all but placed sanctions on other occasions. Israel has had to choose between risking the ire of its closest ally or making the correct military decision. The elimination of Yahya Sinwar in Rafah, a Hamas stronghold the US forbid Israel to enter on the pain of military sanctions, and the discouragement of the Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor, essential to the resupply of Hamas, are prime examples of the restrictive conditions the IDF faces during a Biden administration.

The latest iteration of sub-optimum choices has been the 60-day ceasefire in south Lebanon that Israel has had to accept due to irresistible pressure from the US and France. Israel has conducted a highly effective campaign in Lebanon, tearing the heart out of Hezbollah’s leadership and decisively degrading the Iranian proxy’s fighting power. All this was achieved despite military pundits who overrated Hezbollah’s fighting prowess and underestimated the devastating effectiveness of Israeli cyber technology and the efficacy of the IDF’s urban warfare doctrine. France’s Emmanuel Macron threatened to take the demand for a ceasefire to the United Nations (UN), and Biden threatened to abstain. Israel faced an enforced UN ceasefire, or could choose to accept Biden’s proposal, which at least mitigated some of the damage to the IDF’s operation. Again, Israel was faced with accepting the lesser of two evils.

The 60-day ceasefire in Lebanon coincides almost exactly with Trump’s date to occupy the White House. The Israelis have conducted their operations in the past few months with an eye to the US’s November election. Trump’s overwhelming victory has garnered some hope that Israel will be given American support in dealing with any resurgence of Hezbollah. Dealing with Iran decisively may be back on the cards.

As Israel turns its full attention to Hamas and the release of the hostages, there’s renewed hope. At the top of Trump’s Middle East agenda is to kickstart the Abraham Accords and secure a lasting peace in the region, thereby creating space for catering to the political aspirations of the Palestinians. Certainly, the Iranians, whom the Israelis have humiliated militarily, may have to curtail support of their proxies drastically, and their nuclear programme, or face certain demise at the hands of the IDF fully backed-up by the US.

The demise of Hezbollah’s military and political power has considerably weakened Iran’s and Russia’s grip in Syria. This week, the forces of the Assad regime abandoned Aleppo and dissolved in full retreat in front of fanatical Islamist forces backed by Turkey. Again, the choice of crippling Hezbollah has unleashed a cataclysm in Syria, creating a new challenge for the IDF to deal with in the weeks and months ahead. Interesting times indeed!

• Dr David Brock Katz is a research fellow at Stellenbosch University in the faculty of military science. He has published three books and numerous academic articles dealing with aspects of South African military history and military doctrine.